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Abstract
The paper studies the short run and long run effects of a production sub-
sidy to the tourism sector of a small open economy, which can also be thought
as a region within a country. We introduce a two-sector dynamic general equi-
librium model where the tourism sector is considered to be labor-intensive
and produces traded services. The other sector is capital-intensive and pro-
duces a nontraded good, which is also used for capital accumulation. Labor
and capital can freely move between sectors. Economic decisions are made
by forward-looking representative agents, which optimize their intertemporal
welfare by choosing consumption of both the nontraded good and tourism
services, the sectoral allocation of labor, and the rate of wealth accumula-
tion. We discuss the short run, dynamic and long run effects of a production
subsidy to the tourism sector. In the short run, the introduction of a sub-
sidy to tourism production leads to a boom in that sector. As time passes,
the economy-wide capital stock is decumulated, and production of tourism
is falling. In the long run, compared to the situation before the subsidy was
implemented, tourism production remains on a higher level, whereas output
of the nontraded good drops.
1 Introduction
Subsidies have a long tradition in economic policy, and textbooks are full of
examples. Various definitions of subsidies can be found. In general, a subsidy
is a public financial contribution that confers a benefit to the recipient, i. e. ,
a transfer from the government to a private entity without any payment
in return. This transfer can have the form of a public provision of goods
or services at less than market prices, it may involve direct provision of
funds or regulatory interventions with no direct financial implications for the
government’s budget.
As it is well understood, subsidies may have various economic effects.
The receipt of a subsidy induces a change in the behavior of the recipient,
which may translate into a change on market prices, influencing in turn eco-
nomic decisions of other agents than the recipient (incidence). For example,
a producer who receives an output subsidy which depends on his production
will increase production, other things equal. If the subsidy is granted to a
group of producers, forming a sector in the economy, their increase in out-
put will lead to a fall in the market price of the good being subsidized, and
consumers benefit, too. Moreover, the effects of the subsidy may spill over to
other sectors, as the demand for scarce inputs changes. It is therefore impor-
tant to recognize these indirect effects of a subsidy, which may run counter
to the government’s objectives. However, the usual textbook analysis of the
economic effects of a subsidy uses a partial equilibrium framework by focus-
ing on one market solely. Depending on the magnitude of spill over effects,
such an analysis may be misleading. To take care of the indirect effects of a
subsidy, the analysis should be based on a general equilibrium framework.1
Also, the change in behavior of economic agents and the induced effects on
economic key variables affects the evolution of the economy over time. E. g. ,
a production stimulus may result in higher investment rates and thus in a
larger capital stock and increased output in the future. It seems therefore
appropriate to conduct a full analysis of the economic effects of a subsidy in
an intertemporal general equilibrium framework.2
In practice, there are many possible forms of a subsidy, including direct
payments, tax concessions, contingent liabilities and provision of goods and
services. Subsidies can be distinguished between those that are horizontal
and those that are industry-specific. Industry specific subsidies are targeted
1See, e. g., Blake, Sinclair, and Campos (2006), who argue that general equilibrium
models can take account of the interrelationships among tourism and other sectors in the
domestic economy.
2For the need of dynamic general equilibrium modeling, applied to tourism, see, e. g.,
Dwyer, Forsyth, and Spurr (2004).
1
to one particular industry, whereas horizontal subsidies are generally catego-
rized by functions or objectives and would typically include environmental
and energy-saving subsidies, research and development subsidies, support to
regional development, and so on. A majority of countries uses more horizon-
tal than industry-specific subsidies. Also, subsidies can be direct or indirect.
Direct subsidies are part of government’s expenditures, whereas indirect sub-
sidies tend not to be recognized as subsidies at all. Examples of the latter
are tax benefits, price regulation, export credit facilities, or preferential treat-
ment.
It is evident that subsidies are also granted to the tourism sector of an
economy. The most used indirect subsidies to the tourism sector are:
• exemption from VAT (value added tax) and excise duty on sales on
airports, in planes and outside territorial waters,
• low rate of VAT on entry to amusement parks, sports events, etc.,
• incomplete cost coverage from tourist tax, entertainment charges, etc.,
• designation of land for recreational purposes as part of spatial planning,
• granting of land below cost price by municipalities to promote tourism
activity,
• discounts from public airports to airline companies.
The issue of granting subsidies is receiving growing attention in tourism,
because this sector is one of the most frequently targeted sectors by ser-
vices subsidies. The existence of externalities that are not taken into ac-
count in private production and consumption decisions, the fact that cer-
tain tourism resources have a public good character, and the existence of
information asymmetries between producers and consumers are the main
reasons that justify government intervention in the tourism market. Early
work on these issues was done by Hardin (1968). As reported in World-
Trade-Report (2006), subsidy programs for tourism were mentioned in 62
of their 97 members between 1995 and February 2004. In many developing
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America the annual growth rate in inter-
national tourist arrivals was always positive over the past decade, including
the difficult years 2001 and 2002, resulting in growth rates of the tourism
sector higher than the growth rate for the world economy as a whole, see
World-Tourism-Organization (2005). On average then, tourism-specialized
countries grow more than others, and as a consequence, tourism has been
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promoted in many countries as part of the solution to their economic prob-
lems, see, e. g. , Sinclair (1998) and Durbarry (2004).
Tourism is seen as an important source of foreign exchange earnings,
employment of domestic labor and a contributor to economic growth, and it
is considered to be a sector with strong growth potential. Thus, policy makers
often consider subsidies as a very useful tool to improve the performance of
the tourism sector and to stimulate the development of the country. Tourism
subsidies are also used in many industrialized countries to promote regional
development strategy, to support the agricultural sector and to protect the
environment, as van Beers and de Moor (2001) emphasize.
In general, the motivation for subsidies to the tourism sector differs signif-
icantly across countries and regions, and so does the incidence of subsidies. It
has been argued that government intervention is essential to promote tourism
in early stages of its development. Very often, governments use subsidies for
investments in infrastructure that is relevant for the tourism sector.
While developed and developing counties’ governments may have different
expectations about their tourism sector, most of them share the perception
that market forces alone cannot achieve their policy objectives. Different
forms of government intervention, including the use of subsidies, play a key
role in meeting these goals. Critics to this approach argue, however, that
some of the most impressive development records in tourist destinations are
those where government intervention was kept to the minimum level.
We already pointed out that governments use subsidies in tourism for
many reasons and in many different forms. Recently, natural disasters as
the Indian Ocean tsunami that occurred December 2004 and affected India,
Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand, and hurricane Katrina that
hit the Gulf of Mexico and the United States in August 2005 and terrorist
acts (New York, Madrid, London, and Bali) led to an increase in tourism
subsidies.
Because of the relevance of subsidies in the tourism sector, it is important
that their economic effects are to be well understood. Our aim is to provide a
simple model for such an analysis. Our approach employs a dynamic general
equilibrium two sector model, based on intertemporally optimizing represen-
tative agents and perfect competition, which parallels the one of Turnovsky
and Sen (1995).3 Our model can be viewed as a minimalist model,4 as any
3Hazari and Sgro (2004) analyze the consequences of tourism using dynamic models
of trade. Their chapter 11 contains a Ramsey-type growth model, based in intertem-
poral optimization, but in contrast to our analysis, they abstract from current account
adjustments.
4Our model is analytically tractable. In the literature on the economic effects of
tourism, input-output (IO) models and computational general equilibrium (CGE) mod-
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meaningful macroeconomic model of tourism should comprise at least two
sectors, one of them producing internationally traded tourism services, the
other producing a nontraded good, which can be consumed and invested.5
Because tourism has much to do with consuming services abroad (or with the
consumption of domestically provided tourism services by foreigners), we use
an open economy version of the two sector model. In particular, we assume
that the economy is small in the sense that it faces a given world interest
rate, at which it can lend or borrow at the international financial market.6
We would like to stress that the small open economy framework refers also to
a region within a country and may fit particularly well a region’s economic
environment. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from various different
forms of tourism subsidies and assume that the country’s government grants
a production subsidy to firms in the tourism sector. The tourism sector is
viewed to be labor intensive, an assumption which is confirmed in practice.
The industrial sector is capital intensive. The two factors of production,
labor and capital, can freely move between sectors.
In our analysis, we will highlight the dynamic and the general equilibrium
(spill over) effects of the subsidy. In the short run, the introduction of a
subsidy to tourism production leads to a boom in that sector, as it attracts
both labor and capital from the nontraded sector. Production in both sectors
becomes more capital-intensive. The relative price of the nontraded good in
terms of tourism may fall or rise on impact. As time passes, the economy-
wide capital stock is decumulated,7 and production of tourism is falling. The
relative price of the nontraded good increases gradually, and production in
both sectors gets less capital-intensive.
In the long run, compared to the situation before the subsidy was im-
plemented, tourism production remains on a higher level, whereas output of
the nontraded good drops, and its relative price rises. In this sense, there is
els are frequently used. On applications of these models and comparisons between them,
see, e. g., Adams and Parmenter (1995), Zhou, Yanagida, Chakravorty, and Leung (1997),
Blake and Sinclair (2003), Dwyer, Forsyth, and Spurr (2004), Blake, Sinclair, and Campos
(2006), and Blake (2007).
5Chao, Hazari, Laffargue, Sgro, and Yu (2005) develop a two-sector open economy
model with specific factors in production, based on forward-looking intertemporally opti-
mizing agents. Assuming that the current account is always balanced, in contrast to our
analysis, they abstract from the economig effect of current account adjustments. Nowak,
Sahli, and Sgro (2004) employ a static three-sector general equilibrium model to discuss
the interdependence between tourism and the rest of the economy.
6We view this to be an important extension of open economy models with a tourism
sector, since being able to lend or to borrow at the international financial market has
important implications; see, e. g., Turnovsky (1997, ch. 2, 3).
7This finding is in line with Chao, Hazari, Laffargue, Sgro, and Yu (2005).
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a deindustrialization of the economy, as more resources are devoted to the
service sector.8 The reason is to be found in the economy’s reduced capital
stock, but unchanged long-run sectoral capital intensities. The result resem-
bles therefore the Rybczynski theorem. There is an overshooting in tourism
services, i. e. , its short run boost is larger than its long run increase. Home
residents will consume less of the nontraded good but more tourism both
in the short and long run. The subsidy may be welfare increasing. Thus,
subsidizing the tourism sector may turn out to be an appropriate policy to
create a larger service sector and to increase residents’ welfare.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
economic framework. In section 3 the macroeconomic perfect foresight equi-
librium is discussed. Section 4 turns to dynamics and the economy’s steady-
state. The effects of a subsidy to the tourism sector are analyzed in detail in
section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes our main findings. Some technical
details are delegated to an appendix.9
2 Small open economy with a tourism and a
nontraded sector
The small open economy comprises two sectors, in which a nontraded good,
used for consumption and investment, and tourism services are produced.
Domestic households consume both the nontraded good and tourism services
and supply labor and capital to firms. Both sectors are perfectly competitive,
and all economic agents take market prices as given. In contrast to the
nontraded good, tourism services can be also exported to/imported from the
rest of the world. The small-country assumption refers to a given world
interest rate and to the ability to export/import as much tourism services as
agents want without changing world market prices.
Without any loss of generality we can consolidate the production and
consumption side of the economy to a representative consumer-producer,
who produces and consumes a nontraded commodity and traded tourism
services. The representative agent is endowed with a fixed supply of labor,
L, normalized to unity, and accumulates capital, K. Both labor and capi-
tal can freely move between sectors. Tourism services T are produced using
8Copeland (1991) discusses the conditions under which an increase in tourism can lead
to deindustrialization. See also Nowak, Sahli, and Sgro (2004). Recently, Blake (2007),
using a CGE model comprising 26 sectors, showed that some other sectors of the economy
shrink as tourism expands.
9A detailed appendix, containing all calculations, is available from the authors upon
request.
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a quantity of capital KT and labor LT , by means of a linear homogenous
neoclassical production function F (KT , LT ), with FKT ≡ FK > 0, FLT ≡
FL > 0, FKTKT ≡ FKK < 0, FLTLT ≡ FLL < 0, FKTLT ≡ FKL > 0.10 The
nontraded good N is produced too by combining capital KN and labor LN ,
by means of a second neoclassical production function H(KN , LN), having
the same properties as F . The tourism sector is assumed to be labor inten-
sive, meaning that given wage and interest rate, the tourism sector always
produces with a lower capital-labor-ratio than the nontraded sector, i. e. ,
kT ≡ KT/LT < kN ≡ KN/LN . Finally, only the nontraded good may be
used for investment.
The agent also accumulates net foreign bonds (assets), b, that pay the
exogenously given world interest rate, r. The agent’s flow budget constraint
is thus
b˙ = zF (KT , LT ) + pH(KN , LN)− CT − pCN − pI − S + rb, (1a)
where z ≡ 1 + σ denotes the value of tourism production inclusive the sub-
sidy, σ; CT and CN denote the agent’s consumption of tourism services and
the traded good; p is the relative price of the nontraded good in terms of
tourism services; I denotes investment; and S lump-sum taxes. Assuming for
simplicity that the capital stock does not depreciate, capital accumulation is
given by
K˙ = I. (1b)
The constraints for the allocation of labor and capital between the two sectors
are
LT + LN = 1 (1c)
KT +KN = K. (1d)
The representative consumer-producer chooses his consumption levels, CN
and CT ; the allocations of labor and capital, LN and LT , and KN and KT ,
respectively; the rate of investment, I, and the rate of bond accumulation,
to maximize the intertemporal utility function
W ≡
∞∫
0
U(CT , CN)e
−βtdt, (2)
10Where no ambiguity can arise we shall adopt the convention of letting primes denote
total derivatives and appropriate subscripts partial derivatives. Thus, we shall let f ′(x) ≡
df
dx ; fi(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ ∂f∂xi , fij ≡
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
. Time derivatives will be denoted by dots above the
variable concerned, x˙ ≡ dxdt .
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subject to the constraints (1a) – (1d) and the historically given initial stocks
of capital K(0) = K0 and traded bonds b(0) = b0. β is the rate of con-
sumer time preference, taken to be constant. The instantaneous utility
function U(CT , CN) is assumed to be concave with the following proper-
ties: UCT ≡ UT > 0, UCN ≡ UN > 0, UCTCT ≡ UTT < 0, UCNCN ≡ UNN <
0, UCTCN ≡ UTN > 0, indicating that tourism services and nontraded goods
are Edgeworth complements, implying that the representative agent prefers
to change consumption of the nontraded good and tourism services in the
same direction. Inserting the allocation constraints (1c) and (1d) into the
production functions, the Hamiltonian of the optimization problem can be
written as
H = U(CT , CN) + λ[zF (KT , LT ) + pH(K −KT , 1− LT )− CT − pCN
− pI − S + rb] + γI,
where λ is the shadow value of wealth in the form of traded bonds and can
be interpreted as the marginal utility of wealth in terms of tourism services;
and γ measures the shadow value of capital. The optimality conditions are
given by
UT (CT , CN) = λ (3a)
UN(CT , CN) = pλ (3b)
zFL(KT , LT ) = pHL(KN , LN) (3c)
zFK(KT , LT ) = pHK(KN , LN) (3d)
p = γ/λ (3e)
β − λ˙
λ
= r (3f)
zFK(KT , LT )
p
+
p˙
p
= r = HK(KN , LN) +
p˙
p
(3g)
together with the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
λbe−βt = lim
t→∞
λpKe−βt = 0. (3h)
Equations (3a) and (3b) equate the marginal utilities of consumption of
tourism services and the nontraded good to the marginal utility of wealth in
terms of tourism services and in terms of the nontraded good, λp, respec-
tively. Their ratio gives the familiar condition that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between the nontraded good and tourism services must be equal to
the relative price of the nontraded good. Equations (3c) and (3d) determine
the allocation of labor and capital to the two sectors by equating marginal
7
products. Their ratio gives rise to the standard optimality condition that
the marginal rate of technical substitution between labor and capital must
be equalized across sectors, implying an efficient use of inputs. Equation (3e)
is the first order condition for investment and relates the shadow values of
traded bonds and nontraded capital. Equations (3f) and (3g) are no-arbitrage
conditions. The former equates the rate of return on consumption to the rate
of return on bonds, i. e. , the interest rate. To obtain an interior solution, we
require β = r, which leads to the zero-root property (see Sen (1994)) λ = λ¯,
implying a time-constant marginal utility of wealth, which has important
consequences for the dynamics (see Schubert and Turnovsky (2002)), as the
long-run equilibrium becomes dependent on initial conditions. The latter
equates the rates of return on capital invested in the tourism sector and in
the nontraded sector to the interest rate.
The government is the other agent in the small open economy, playing a
simple role. It collects lump-sum taxes S to finance its production subsidy
to the tourism sector, σF (KT , LT ). For the sake of simplicity and without
changing results11, we assume that the government maintains a balanced
budget. Its budget constraint is therefore
σF (KT , LT ) = S. (4)
3 Macroeconomic equilibrium
The macroeconomic equilibrium of this intertemporal general equilibrium
model is defined to be a situation in which all the planned supply and demand
functions are derived from optimization behavior, the economy is continually
in equilibrium, and all anticipated variables are correctly forecasted. We will
call this concept a “perfect foresight equilibrium”.12
From the consumption optimality conditions (3a), (3b), we get13
CT = CT (λ¯, p);
∂CT
∂λ¯
< 0,
∂CT
∂p
< 0 (5a)
CN = CN(λ¯, p);
∂CN
∂λ¯
< 0,
∂CN
∂p
< 0. (5b)
11If we introduced government bonds, results would not change, because according to
the Ricardian equivalence proposition, government bonds in a model like ours do not
constitute part of agents’ net wealth. See the seminal work of Barro (1974).
12See, e. g., Brock and Turnovsky (1981), p. 180.
13The signs of the partial derivatives are reported in appendix A.1.
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The analysis of the production side can be simplified by working with pro-
duction functions in intensive form, i. e. ,
f(kT ) ≡ F (KT , LT )/LT ; h(kN) ≡ H(KN ;LN)/LN .
Thus, the production block (3c) and (3d) can be written as
z[f(kT )− f ′(kT )kT ] = p[h(kN)− h′(kN)kN ] (3c′)
zf ′(kT ) = ph′(kN) (3d′)
and may be solved together with (1c) and (1d) to yield
kT = kT (p, σ);
∂kT
∂p
< 0,
∂kT
∂σ
> 0 (6a)
kN = kN(p, σ);
∂kN
∂p
< 0,
∂kN
∂σ
> 0 (6b)
LT = LT (K, p, σ);
∂LT
∂K
< 0,
∂LT
∂p
< 0,
∂LT
∂σ
> 0 (6c)
LN = LN(K, p, σ);
∂LN
∂K
> 0,
∂LN
∂p
> 0,
∂LN
∂σ
< 0, (6d)
The outputs of tourism services and nontraded goods are obtained by sub-
stituting (6a) – (6d) into the sector-specific production functions:
YT = LT (K, p, σ)f [kT (p, σ)] ≡ YT (K, p, σ); ∂YT
∂K
< 0,
∂YT
∂p
< 0,
∂YT
∂σ
> 0 (7a)
YN = LN (K, p, σ)h[kN (p, σ)] ≡ YN (K, p, σ); ∂YN
∂K
> 0,
∂YN
∂p
> 0,
∂YN
∂σ
< 0. (7b)
Equations (6) and (7) deserve further explanation. An increase in the
economy-wide capital stock K reduces production of tourism services and
increases production of the nontraded good. This result is due to the Ry-
bczynski theorem14: An increase in the capital stock, given relative output
price and hence the wage-rental-rate-ratio and sectoral capital intensities, in-
creases output of the good whose production is capital intensive and reduces
production of the labor intensive good. Therefore, labor employed in the
tourism sector falls, whereas it rises in the nontraded sector. An increase
in the relative price of the nontraded good leads to a change in the output
mix, as resources are shifted from the tourism sector into the nontraded sec-
tor, which can offer higher factor rewards, and this is reflected in opposite
output reactions. Production in both sectors becomes less capital intensive,
14See Rybczynski (1955).
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and employment in the tourism sector falls along with contracted tourism
output, whereas labor used in the nontraded sector is increased. On the
other hand, a higher subsidy on tourism production attracts resources to
this sector, and given overall labor and capital endowment, the tourism sec-
tor expands, whereas the nontraded sector shrinks, as labor and capital move
from the nontraded sector into the tourism industry. Both sectors become
more capital intensive.
Finally, macroeconomic equilibrium requires that the market for the non-
traded good clears, i. e.
YN(K, p, σ) = CN(λ¯, p) + I, (8)
which states that nontraded output must be allocated either to consumption
or investment. Inserting (4) and (8) into (1a), we get the country’s current
account
b˙ = [YT − CT ] + rb, (9)
where the term in brackets represents the balance of payments on goods and
services (which in our model is simply the service balance), and rb denotes
(net) interest income from abroad.15
4 Equilibrium dynamics and steady state
Denoting steady-state values with tildes, the linearized dynamics for the
relative price and the overall capital stock follow from (1b), (3g), and (8)
and are given by(
p˙
K˙
)
=
( − zf
p˜(kN−kT ) 0(
∂YN
∂p
− ∂CN
∂p
)
h
kN−kT
)(
p− p˜
K − K˜
)
(10)
Because the determinant of the matrix in (10) is negative, the system has
one positive and one negative eigenvalue, denoted by µ1 < 0, and is therefore
saddle-path stable. The stable solutions for the relative price, p, and the
economy’s capital stock, K, are:
p(t)− p˜ = X(K0 − K˜)eµ1t (11a)
K(t)− K˜ = (K0 − K˜)eµ1t. (11b)
15In case that the small economy is a region rather than a country, no official balance
of payments statistics may exist. Nonetheless, the economic relationships remain exactly
the same as for a country.
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Equations (11a) and (11b) can be combined to obtain the stable saddle-path
p(t) − p˜ = X[K(t) − K˜], which is a negative line in (K, p)-space with slope
X:
X ≡
(
µ1 − h
kN − kT
)(
∂YN
∂p
− ∂CN
∂p
)−1
< 0.
Using (11a), (5a) and (7a), after some algebra the linearized bonds accumu-
lation equation (9) can be written as
b˙ = Ω(K − K˜) + r(b− b˜), (12)
where
Ω ≡
[
p˜
z
(
r − zµ1 − (1− z)∂YN
∂K
)
−
(
p˜
z
(1− z)∂YN
∂p
+
∂C
∂p
)
X
]
.
The stable solution for the economy’s net foreign asset position can then be
found to be
b(t)− b˜ = Ω
µ1 − r (K(t)− K˜). (13)
Setting t = 0 in (13) yields the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint
which ensures that the economy remains intertemporally solvent. After a
shock, e. g. , introducing a production subsidy to the tourism sector, proper
adjustments of the marginal utility of wealth and the relative price of the
nontraded good guarantee the economy’s long-run solvency. The relationship
between the evolution of the economy’s capital stock and its net foreign
assets (traded bonds) depends on the sign of Ω/(µ1 − r), which measures a
direct and an indirect effect of an increase in the capital stock on the current
account and thus on bonds accumulation. The direct effect is negative and
reflects the Rybczynski effect that an increase in the capital stock decreases
tourism production, which — viewed in isolation — deteriorates the balance
of trade and services and therefore the current account. The indirect effect
describes the impact of capital accumulation on savings. Along the saddle-
path, an increase in the capital stock towards steady-state lowers the relative
price p. Because of p(t) > p˜, this implies lower real consumption C ≡
CT + pCN and higher real income Y ≡ YT + pYN than in steady-state, and
therefore positive savings, which together with declining investment improve
the current account. Unless this indirect effect is large, the current account
will move inversely with the capital stock, which we therefore shall assume
(i. e. Ω > 0).
The economy’s steady-state equilibrium is reached when p˙ = K˙ = b˙ = 0.
Hence, we get the steady-state relationships
zf ′(k˜T ) = p˜h′(k˜N) (14a)
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h′(k˜N) = r (14b)
z[f(k˜T )− f ′(k˜T )k˜T ] = p˜[h(k˜N)− h′(k˜N)k˜N ] (14c)
L˜T k˜T + (1− L˜T )k˜N = K˜ (14d)
(1− L˜T )h(k˜N)− CN(λ¯, p˜) = 0 (14e)
L˜Tf(k˜T )− CT (λ¯, p˜) + rb˜ = 0 (14f)
b0 − b˜ = Ω
µ1 − r (K0 − K˜) (14g)
Several aspects of this equilibrium merit comment. The steady-state opti-
mality conditions for the allocation of capital (14a), (14b) and labor (14c)
jointly determine the two sectors’ capital intensities k˜i and the long-run rel-
ative price; they are only dependent on the subsidy σ. Given the values of
k˜T , k˜N , p˜, the capital allocation constraint (14d), the market clearing condi-
tion for the nontraded good (14e), the long-run zero current account (14f),
and the intertemporal solvency condition (14g) yield then the economy’s
steady-state capital stock K˜, the long-run labor allocation between sectors,
L˜T and L˜N = 1 − L˜T , the long-run stock of net foreign assets, b˜, and the
equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯. From the equilibrium
relative price and the marginal utility of wealth steady-state consumption of
the nontraded good and of tourism services of domestic residents are derived.
We therefore see that a subsidy to the tourism sector has direct effects on the
production side of the economy, summarized by (14a) – (14c), and indirect
effects on the demand side.
5 Analysis of a subsidy to the tourism sector
Steady state changes
Since our model assumes perfect foresight, the dynamic evolution of the
economy and hence the transitional adjustment is determined in part by
agents’ expectations of the ultimate steady-state. It is therefore convenient
to start our analysis with the investigation of the long-run steady-state effects
of the introduction of a subsidy σ (respectively z = 1 + σ) to the tourism
sector. These are given by
dk˜T
dσ
=
dk˜N
dσ
= 0 (15a)
dp˜
dσ
=
p˜
z
> 0 (15b)
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dK˜
dσ
=
p˜(k˜T − k˜N)
zD
[
∂CT
∂λ¯
∂CN
∂p
− ∂CN
∂λ¯
∂CT
∂p
]
< 0 (15c)
dL˜T
dσ
= −dL˜N
dσ
=
p˜
zD
[
∂CT
∂λ¯
∂CN
∂p
− ∂CN
∂λ¯
∂CT
∂p
]
> 0 (15d)
dY˜T
dσ
=
dL˜T
dσ
f(k˜T ) > 0 (15e)
dY˜N
dσ
=
dL˜N
dσ
h(k˜N) = −dL˜T
dσ
h(k˜N) < 0 (15f)
dλ¯
dσ
=
p˜
zD
[
∂CN
∂p
(
rΩ
µ1 − r (k˜T − k˜N) + f
)
+ h
∂CT
∂p
]
< 0 (15g)
dC˜T
dσ
=
(−)
∂CT
∂dλ¯
(−)
dλ¯
dσ
+
(−)
∂CT
∂p
(+)
dp˜
dσ
=
dY˜T
dσ
+ r
db˜
dσ
> 0 (15h)
dC˜N
dσ
=
(−)
∂CN
∂dλ¯
(−)
dλ¯
dσ
+
(−)
∂CN
∂p
(+)
dp˜
dσ
=
dY˜N
dσ
< 0 (15i)
db˜
dσ
=
Ω
µ1 − r
dK˜
dσ
> 0 (15j)
D ≡ −
[
∂CN
∂λ¯
(
rΩ
µ1 − r (k˜T − k˜N) + f
)
+ h
∂CT
∂λ¯
]
> 0
and merit further comment. First, subsidizing tourism production has no
effect on long-run capital intensities, as (15a) states. The reason is that the
steady-state capital intensity in the nontraded sector, k˜N , is determined by
the non-traded sector’s production function h and the interest rate r alone,
both of them which are not affected by the subsidy. Since an efficient factor
allocation requires the equality of both sectors’ marginal rates of technical
substitution between capital and labor, it follows that the long-run capital
intensity in the tourism sector, k˜T , remains unchanged, too. Therefore, all
that happens on the production side of the economy is that the subsidy raises
the relative price of the nontraded good, p˜, as (15b) indicates, to guarantee
equality between the rates of return on capital in both sectors. Second, (15c)
tells us that the economy’s long-run capital stock drops. This is a result of
the dynamic adjustment caused by the subsidy. Together with the change
in labor allocation, given in (15d), it follows that long-run production of
the nontraded good (15f) falls, whereas steady-state tourism services (15e)
increase. In the long-run, there is a deindustrialization of the economy, as
the economy’s overall capital stock and thus its capital-labor-ratio falls, the
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capital intensive sector shrinks, and resources are shifted to the labor in-
tensive tourism sector.16 Third, (15g) indicates that the marginal utility of
wealth falls, implying a positive wealth effect on the side of domestic con-
sumers. Viewed in isolation, the wealth effect increases consumption of both
goods. But as (15h) and (15i) show, only consumption of tourism services
is raised, and consumption of the nontraded good falls. The reason is that
the negative substitution effect of the relative price increase works against
consumption of the nontraded good and outweighs the positive wealth effect.
Fourth, looking at (15j), the economy’s long-run net foreign asset position in-
creases, indicating that during transition the country runs a current account
surplus. This in turn implies higher net interest earnings on traded bonds,
and thus a deterioration in the balance of trade and services. The increase in
net interest income allows domestic agents to increase their consumption of
tourism services over and above the growth in its production, indicating that
domestic residents can afford to spend more on tourism activities abroad.
Impact effects
Having described the long-run effects of the subsidy, we turn to the short-
run (impact) effects. Initially, the subsidy attracts labor and capital out of
the nontraded sector into the tourism industry. Hence, production of tourism
services increases and nontraded output falls. Both sectors’ capital intensities
increase.17
dkT (0)
dσ
> 0,
dkN(0)
dσ
> 0,
dKT (0)
dσ
> 0,
dKN(0)
dσ
< 0
dLT (0)
dσ
= −dLN(0)
dσ
> 0,
dYT (0)
dσ
> 0,
dYN(0)
dσ
< 0
The impact effect on the relative price, p, is ambiguous. This can be seen by
taking the derivative of equation (11a) at time t = 0:
dp(0)
dσ
=
(+)
dp˜
dσ
−
(−)
dK˜
dσ
(−)
X ≷ 0; dp(0)
dσ
<
dp˜
dσ
.
The reason for the ambiguity is that p plays a dual role both as a price for the
nontraded good and for an asset, i. e. nontraded capital K. The no-arbitrage
16This is again a consequence of the Rybczynski theorem. On tourism and deindustri-
alization, see, e. g., Copeland (1991).
17These results are proven in appendix A.2.
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condition for capital (3g) requires the equality between the rates of return
on capital and on bonds
h′(kN) +
p˙
p
= r
to hold continuously except at moments where new information arrives. On
impact, the marginal product of capital h′(kN) falls, and agents know that
the price of capital p increases over time, creating therefore a capital gain.
Depending on which effect dominates, the market price of capital has to fall
or to rise on impact, but it always will settle below its new steady-state level.
Turning to consumption, domestic demand for tourism services unam-
biguously increases, because the initial response of p falls below its steady-
state change, and because steady-state C˜T increases, see (15h), whereas the
effect on demand for nontraded goods is ambiguous,
dCT (0)
dσ
=
(−)
∂CT
∂dλ¯
(−)
dλ¯
dσ
+
(−)
∂CT
∂p
(?)
dp(0)
dσ
> 0
dCN(0)
dσ
=
(−)
∂CN
∂dλ¯
(−)
dλ¯
dσ
+
(−)
∂CN
∂p
(?)
dp(0)
dσ
≷ 0
If p falls on impact, consumption of the nontraded good rises, because of both
the positive wealth effect, embodied in the reduced λ¯, and the lower market
price of nontraded goods. However, if p increases sufficiently on impact, this
will outweigh the wealth effect, and CN(0) falls. Viewed in another way,
despite the fact that production of YN falls on impact, the decumulation of
capital, i. e. , disinvestment that sets in may allow higher consumption CN ,
depending on the magnitudes of output and investment responses.
Dynamic transition
On impact, the economy, given its initial stocks of capital K0 and traded
bonds b0, starting off from an “old” steady-state, denoted by p˜0, K˜0, b˜0, jumps
from point A to point B on the stable saddle-path XX depicted in the upper
part of figure 1. We have drawn the figure for the case of an initial drop of
the relative price. The lower part of the figure portraits the relationship be-
tween the economy’s capital stock and its net foreign assets; it is a graphical
representation of the intertemporal solvency condition. From thereon, the
economy moves along XX and NN from points B and P towards points
C and Q, respectively. The dynamic adjustment is characterized by a de-
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Figure 1: Increase in subsidy σ
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cumulation of capital,18 an increasing relative price, and a positive current
account, as equations (11) and (13) confirm.
The rising relative price exercises serval effects on economic key variables.
Taking time derivatives of equations (6a) and (6b),
k˙T =
∂kT
∂p
p˙ < 0, k˙N =
∂kN
∂p
p˙ < 0
reveals that both sectors’ capital intensities are falling over time. This is due
to the economy’s deindustrialization, caused by a falling capital stock. The
production of tourism services falls over time,19 and because steady-state
production is higher than before granting the subsidy, this indicates that the
subsidy causes an overshooting of tourism production on impact, i. e.
dYT (0)
dσ
>
dY˜T
dσ
> 0, Y˙T < 0.
The dynamics of the nontraded good are less clear. The initial reshuﬄing
of the capital stock leads to a drop in YN . This is a consequence of the
Rybczynski theorem. From thereon, as time passes, two opposite forces are
at work. The gradually falling economy-wide capital stock lowers production
due to the Rybczynski theorem, whereas the rising relative price makes it
more attractive. Time differentiating the nontraded goods market equilib-
rium condition, equation (8), i. e. YN = CN(λ¯, p) + K˙, and using the stable
adjustment paths for p(t) and K(t), equations (11), we obtain
Y˙N =
 (−)∂CN
∂p
(−)
X +
(−)
µ1
 (+)[K(t)− K˜](−)µ1 .
If X, the slope of the stable saddle path, is sufficiently negative, that is, if
the negative relation between the capital stock and the relative price of the
nontraded good is sufficiently strong, the expression within large brackets
becomes positive, and we get Y˙N < 0, hence deindustrialization continues
after the impact contraction of nontraded output. A sufficient condition for
this to happen is that the absolute value of the price elasticity of consumption
demand for the nontraded good exceeds the price elasticity of its supply.
To understand the ambiguity of the evolution of nontraded output, note
first that the evolution of the demand component investment (in our case
actually disinvestment) is given by the time derivative of I, i. e. I˙ = µ21[K(t)−
18See also Chao, Hazari, Laffargue, Sgro, and Yu (2005).
19This is shown in appendix A.2.
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K˜] > 0, and depends – ceteris paribus – not on the slope of the saddle
path. Hence, over time investment, although negative, increases. Second,
consumption of the nontraded good depends on the marginal utility of wealth,
λ¯, which changes once and for all at time 0, and on the relative price, p, which
rises over time. If X is large (in absolute value), the relative price p does not
change much on impact, and compared to the new steady-state, consumption
CN(0) is relatively high, since p(0) is far below p˜. But this implies that CN
will have to fall a lot during transition. Together with the given increase
in investment demand, aggregate demand for the nontraded good falls, and
this calls for production cuts over time. If, on the other hand, X is small (in
absolute value), p changes quite a lot on impact, and therefore consumption
CN(0) is already relatively low and will fall only modestly over time. In
that case, the increase in investment demand will outweigh the reduction
in consumption demand for the nontraded good, hence increasing aggregate
demand for the nontraded good stimulates its production over time. In the
former case (|X| sufficiently large), the impact reaction of YN undershoots
its steady-state change, and deindustrialization continues over time, that is
0 >
dYN(0)
dσ
>
dY˜N
dσ
, Y˙N < 0.
In the latter case (|X| small), YN overshoots it’s steady-state change, that is,
deindustrialization is largest on impact, and as time passes, the nontraded
sector recovers partially, i. e.
dYN(0)
dσ
<
dY˜N
dσ
< 0, Y˙N > 0.
As time passes by, domestic agents’ consumption of both tourism services
and nontraded goods falls because of the increasing relative price, as the
time derivatives of equations (5a) and (5a) reveal. The reason is that the
marginal utility of wealth in terms of the nontraded good, λp, increases,
exercising thus a negative wealth effect, which outweighs the substitution
effect of the price increase in favor of tourism services. Because long-run
consumption of tourism services rises, it follows that CT (0) overshoots its
steady-state value, too, i. e.
dCT (0)
dσ
>
dC˜T
dσ
> 0, C˙T < 0.
The initial boom in the tourism sector is so large that it outweighs increased
domestic demand by far, the excess being sold (exported) to foreigners.20 The
20To be exact, this holds if the nation is a net debtor (b < 0). If the country is a net
creditor (b > 0), then the boom reduces the trade balance deficit, and less tourism services
are imported (net) from abroad.
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current account is thus turned into surplus, and the economy accumulates
traded bonds/decumulates its debt, as it moves up the NN schedule.
Eventually, the steady-state is reached, and all adjustments are com-
pleted. The economy is equipped with a lower capital stock and produces
less nontraded goods but more tourism services than before the subsidy was
introduced.
Welfare effects of subsidy
Let us finally address the question if a production subsidy to the tourism
sector is socially desirable. First, it is important to note that the subsidy
itself causes a direct wealth effect to agents, despite the fact that all subsidy
receipts are taxed away. Second, the subsidy changes the structure of the
economy and the consumption pattern, and these changes will have substan-
tial effects on the wellbeing of economic agents. Denoting their instantaneous
utility function Z(t) = U(CT (t), CN(t)), intertemporal utility or welfare
W =
∫ ∞
0
Z(t)e−rtdt (16)
can be approximated by21
W =
Z˜
r
+
Z(0)− Z˜
r − µ1 . (17)
The introduction of the subsidy affects both time-zero utility Z(0) and steady-
state utility Z˜, and thus welfare
dW
dσ
=
1
r − µ1
[
dZ(0)
dσ
− µ1
r
dZ˜
dσ
]
. (18)
The effect on utilities is ambiguous, but we have
dZ(0)
dσ
>
dZ˜
dσ
.
Thus the subsidy doesn’t unambiguously raises welfareW of domestic agents.
Initially, the boom in the tourism sector allows higher consumption of tourism
services, and consumption of nontraded goods may rise or fall, in sum this
may raise instantaneous utility Z(0). If p(0) drops on impact, Z(0) will
unambiguously rise. Steady-state utility may increase, too, despite the fact
21For details, see appendix A.3.
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of deindustrialization, because in the long-run the economy’s net foreign asset
position, b˜, has improved, yielding higher net interest earnings, which allow
domestic agents to permanently raise tourism consumption. If the increase in
the long-run relative price p˜ is sufficiently small, the subsidy will be welfare
increasing. Loosely speaking, as long as the drops of steady-state nontraded
output Y˜N and therefore steady-state consumption of the nontraded good
C˜N are not too large, agents’ steady-state utility Z˜ will increase, thus rising
their welfare W .
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have modeled a two sector small open economy, producing
labor intensive tourism services and a capital intensive nontraded good, in-
tended for consumption and investment. The economy can export/import
tourism services and has perfect access to the world financial market, thus
facing a given world interest rate.
The model predicts that a production subsidy to the tourism sector leads
to a boom in that sector in the short run, as capital and labor move out of the
nontraded sector, resulting in a drop in production there. Production in both
sectors becomes more capital intensive. On impact, tourism production and
consumption both overshoot their new steady-state levels. The dynamic ef-
fects of the subsidy comprise an increase in the relative price of the nontraded
good, capital decumulation, and a gradual reduction of domestic residents’
consumption of tourism services. The economy runs a current account sur-
plus, thus accumulating net traded bonds. In the new long-run equilibrium,
the economy is equipped with a lower stock of capital and an improved net
foreign asset position, and produces less nontraded goods but more tourism
services that before the subsidy was introduced. A deindustrialization has
taken place. Domestic consumers are able to consume more tourism ser-
vices, either at home or abroad, but cut consumption of the nontraded good.
Therefore, the overall effect on domestic residents’ wellbeing is ambiguous.
If deindustrialization is not too severe, the introduction of a subsidy will be
welfare improving. Before implementing a subsidy to the tourism sector, a
careful analysis of the economic structure is therefore necessary.
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A Appendix
A.1 Partial derivatives
From (3a) and (3b) we calculate
∂CT
∂λ¯
=
UNN − pUTN
UTTUNN − U2TN
< 0,
∂CT
∂p
=
−λ¯UTN
UTTUNN − U2TN
< 0 (A.1a)
∂CN
∂λ¯
=
pUTT − UTN
UTTUNN − U2TN
< 0,
∂CN
∂p
=
λ¯UTT
UTTUNN − U2TN
< 0 (A.1b)
where UTTUNN − U2TN > 0 because of the concavity of U . From the pro-
duction block (3c′) and (3d′) together with the capital allocation constraint
(1d), noting that dz/dσ = 1, we derive
∂kT
∂p
=
h
zf ′′(kN − kT ) ,
∂kT
∂σ
= − ph
z2f ′′(kN − kT ) (A.2a)
∂kN
∂p
=
zf
p2h′′(kN − kT ) ,
∂kN
∂σ
= − f
ph′′(kN − kT ) (A.2b)
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN = −
∂LN
∂K
(A.2c)
∂LT
∂p
=
(
LNzf
p2h′′
+
LTh
zf ′′
)
1
(kN − kT )2 = −
∂LN
∂p
< 0 (A.2d)
∂LT
∂σ
= −
(
LNf
ph′′
+
LTph
z2f ′′
)
1
(kN − kT )2 = −
∂LN
∂σ
> 0, (A.2e)
From (7a) and (7b)we get:
∂YT
∂K
=
∂LT
∂K
f =
f
kT − kN ,
∂YN
∂K
=
h
kN − kT (A.3a)
∂YT
∂p
=
(
LNzf
2
p2h′′
+
LTph
2
z2f ′′
)
1
(kN − kT )2 < 0. (A.3b)
∂YT
∂σ
= −
(
LNz
2f 2
ph′′
+
LTp
2h2
zf ′′
)
1
z2(kN − kT )2 > 0. (A.3c)
∂YN
∂p
= −
(
LNz
2f 2
p2h′′
+
LTph
2
zf ′′
)
1
p(kN − kT )2 > 0 (A.3d)
∂YN
∂σ
=
(
LNzf
2
p2h′′
+
LTph
2
z2f ′′
)
1
(kN − kT )2 < 0. (A.3e)
The signs in the text follow from kT < kN .
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A.2 Impact effects
Proof that dYT (0)/dσ > 0
From (13) and (11b), we derive
b˙ =
Ω
µ1 − rµ1(K − K˜) > 0 and b¨ =
Ω
µ1 − rµ
2
1(K − K˜) < 0
because K(0) > K˜. Time-differentiating the current account equation (9),
recognizing b˙ > 0 and b¨ < 0, we get
b¨ = Y˙T − C˙T + rb˙ < 0
Because C˙T =
∂CT
∂p
p˙ < 0, and b˙ > 0, b¨ < 0 if and only if Y˙T ¿ C˙T < 0.
Finally, the ultimate steady-state increase of Y˜T , following from (15e), and
the fact that Y˙T < 0 during transition proves
dYT (0)
dσ
>
dY˜T
dσ
> 0. (A.4)
Proof of initial responses of ki(0), LT (0), KT (0)
Because steady-state capital intensities do not change, and since k˙i < 0, we
must have kT (0) > k˜T = kT0, kN(0) > k˜N = kN0, where ki0 denotes the
“old” steady-state value before the subsidy was introduced. Thus,
dkT (0)
dσ
> 0,
dkN(0)
dσ
> 0. (A.5)
Rewriting the capital resource constraint (1d) in intensive form, noting that
at t = 0 the overall capital-labor-ratio k0 and L are given, i. e. kT (0)LT (0) +
kN(0)LN(0) = k0L, and differentiating w. r. t.σ, noting dLT/dσ = −dLN/dσ,
gives
[kT (0)− kN(0)] dLT (0)
dσ
+
dkT (0)
dσ
LT +
dkT (0)
dσ
LN = 0.
Because kT < kN , and both sectors’ capital intensities rise on impact, we
obtain
dLT (0)
dσ
= −dLN(0)
dσ
> 0. (A.6)
Finally, (A.5) and (A.6) together with the given overall capital stock K0 =
KT (0) +KN(0) imply
dKT (0)
dσ
> 0,
dKN(0)
dσ
< 0. (A.7)
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A.3 Welfare effects
We first note that Z(t) can be linearly approximated as
Z(t) = Z˜ +
[
UT
∂CT
∂p
+ UN
∂CN
∂p
]
(p− p˜). (A.8)
Using the stable solution for p− p˜, this becomes
Z(t) = Z˜ +
[
Z(0)− Z˜
]
eµ1t (A.9)
Using (3a) and (3b), the impact and steady-state effects on instantaneous
utility are
dZ(0)
dσ
= λ¯
[
∂CT
∂λ¯
+ p
∂CN
∂λ¯
]
dλ¯
dσ
+ λ¯
[
∂CT
∂p
+ p
∂CN
∂p
]
dp(0)
dσ
(A.10a)
and
dZ˜
dσ
= λ¯
[
∂CT
∂λ¯
+ p
∂CN
∂λ¯
]
dλ¯
dσ
+ λ¯
[
∂CT
∂p
+ p
∂CN
∂p
]
dp˜
dσ
(A.10b)
Note that the expressions in brackets have negative sign. Evaluating the
welfare integral (16), using (A.9), yields (17). The change in welfare is then
dW
dσ
=
1
r − µ1
[
dZ(0)
dσ
− µ1
r
dZ˜
dσ
]
. (A.11)
Substituting (A.10a) and (A.10b) and simplifying gives
dW
dσ
=
λ¯
r − µ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂CT
∂λ¯
(−)
+ p
∂CN
∂λ¯
(−)
 µ2
r
(+)
dλ¯
dσ
(−)
+ λ¯
∂CN
∂λ¯
(−)
µ2
r
dp˜
dσ
(+)
− λ¯∂CN
∂λ¯
(−)
X
(−)
dK˜
dσ
(−)

The presence of the term
λ¯
∂CN
∂λ¯
(−)
µ2
r
dp˜
dσ
(+)
< 0
makes the sign of dW/dσ ambiguous.
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